
















This paper aims to decipher the implications of the notions of autonomy and commitment as used in cultural criticism in terms of their relationship to power. More particularly, I will interpret the critical position of autonomy as a type of ‘paradoxical commitment’. I will demonstrate that the autonomous stance may constitute an epistemological tool that is more relevant than the one of traditional commitment to contest forms of institutional and dominant power. Such a position is paradoxical, because the autonomous position stems not from a dialectical engagement to the object of socio-historical reality, but from its radical disengagement; that is, precisely from a non-involvement with the conditions of the real. I will show that traditional commitment (which I will differentiate from ‘paradoxical commitment’) is grounded in the modality of opposition: it opposes a power in a frontal way. It is a stance that commits itself to the other side of the scale of institutional power, as oppositional politics would do. Meanwhile, the autonomous position is based on a rhetoric of contrary: it does not oppose power in a direct way, using its codes and language; rather, it creates and invests a dialectical space of its own. In doing so, the autonomous position is able to nihilate the frame of power, precisely because it has the ability to circumvent the very terms of this power.​[1]​ Crucially, this difference of modality in the response to power pertains to many fields of the humanities. I will develop a few particular examples in the following paragraphs.
To start with, and to shed light on the modality of contrary, I will focus on Buddhism, and specifically Zen Buddhism, which suggests a theological use of an autonomous frame of reference to defeat dialectical systems of power. I shall start by focusing on the ethics of Buddhism. One of the aims of Buddhism is to reach a state of egolessness, which one may achieve through deflation of the ego, understood as forms of self-awareness and self-hood. Very generally, Buddhism suggests the need to reduce desires, which it regards to be at the origin of human suffering. Some practitioners, however, realised the essential theoretical contradiction at work in this key principle: desiring not to desire, is still a form of desire. This contradiction is, in fact, an instance of sterile opposition that cannot defeat the very structure of power. The issue remained, as to how to escape the initial desire of wanting a desire-less existence, and the branch of Zen Buddhism tackled such a contradiction. Zen Buddhism resolved the issue through an approach based on a rhetoric of contrary, which avoided the pitfalls of an oppositional strategy – wanting/not wanting, thereby cancelling itself out. For Zen proponents, the way out of dialectical relationships resides in the concept of ‘wu-wei’.​[2]​ Wu-wei (hardly translatable into English) means something close to ‘non-action’, which implies a notion of chance, of spontaneity. Alan Watts, in The Way of Zen, says Wu-wei is about ‘not to force things’.​[3]​ It is ‘action in accordance with the character of the moment’.​[4]​ It champions a literal un-consciousness – a state where the cultural components of the individual, his or her ego, are shut and give in to the stream of instinct and intuition. It is, above all, about not forcing any will onto one's mind, not controlling one’s own ego in any way. These few lines from a poem written by Seng-ts'an, the oldest Zen poem, may help to define wu-wei in more detail:

Only when you stop liking and disliking
Will all be clearly understood. […]
 If you want to get the plain truth,
Be not concerned with right and wrong,
The conflict between right and wrong
is the sickness of the mind.​[5]​

 The ‘sickness of the mind’ is the oppositional strategy, which, as it aims to nullify the enemy, nullifies itself at the same time. Rather, the power of wu-wei is located in its essence of alterity, which finds its expression through spontaneous being; it thus comes as a rhetoric of contrary, overcoming oppositions to resolve the initial issue of desiring not to desire.
Therefore, if a man sets out to seek the Buddha in a conscious way, that man loses the Buddha: this is the corollary of the awareness of the desire to shut one’s own ego. On the contrary, through a form of spontaneity – that is, a leap into action outside causality – wu-wei channels the principles of Buddhism. As it embodies a rhetoric of contrary, writing itself out of the dialectical traps of its own terms, it corresponds to a position of autonomy that manages to defeat the structure of power it seeks to contest. This ethos of autonomy in Zen Buddhism echoes the story of Gautama, soon-to-be-Buddha, who, after seven years of spiritual quest, ended his search for Enlightenment and found it as soon as he let go of his desire: his self-awareness of wanting to annihilate the ego vanished when he stopped clinging to it. That is to say, once the notion of ego was formally contradicted in itself, Gautama became liberated from desire and could genuinely embody the Buddha.
	In the next paragraph, I will demonstrate that the chasm between strategies of opposition and strategies of contrary also concerns psychoanalytic theory. Freud, in his essay 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle' (1920), underlined the dialectical interplay between life instinct and death instinct in the individual’s psyche.​[6]​ According to Freud, the sex drive is aiming at preserving life; its goal, precisely, is to bind unities together. It is a tendency towards life, organisation and growth. The death drive comes as its opposite: its primary aim is to destroy life, to un-do connections. It is a tendency towards decomposition and annihilation. Its essential goal is to bring all the living back to a primitive state of inorganic matter. Sex drive and death drive constitute an opposition, which is based on the fundamental assumption that what faces the act of creation... is an act of destruction.
Jung, however, did not embrace the terms of this psychic operation. In On the Psychology of the Unconscious (1912), he agrees with Freud on the definition of life instinct and sex drive;​[7]​ however for Jung, the act of creation cannot be opposed by an act of destruction, since an act of destruction is still a creative act. Rather, Jung conceived the death instinct as a mere degradation of the life instinct in the form of a decrease in the availability of life energy, in lieu of a pro-active death drive. Here, the concept of the sex drive is not met with its opposite, but with its contrary: degradation of life energy, paralysis, fear – in essence, immobility. Consequently for Jung, the death instinct is but a function of the strength of life energy: when this energy tends towards nil, the death intinct ingrained in the subject is at its maximum. In these terms, Jung encapsulated a modality of contrary at the core of his theory to describe the forces at stake in the psychic constitution of a subject.
Last but not least, Theodor Adorno, in his essay ‘Commitment’ (1962), underlined the relevance of the application of rhetorical contraries in literary criticism.​[8]​ Adorno classified artworks into two categories: committed art (artworks that react to historical reality) and autonomous art (no direct and/or explicit relation to the socio-historical context). Committed artworks, as they display representations of reality, aim to provoke a reaction that is capable to alter this reality. Such artworks seek to frontally oppose a power, or a status-quo; they reference an explicit political intention. Autonomous artworks, on the contrary, do not aim to react directly against the conditions of the real. Featuring a position akin to the motto ‘art for art’s sake’, they are characterised by their disconnection from the issues of the real. In their celebration of aestheticism, they do not intend to explicitly direct or manipulate an audience for social or political purposes. Therefore, they partake neither in institutional power, nor in its frontal opposition: they have the capacity to contradict the very essence of power through their mere formal existence, which ignores the very dialectical system of this power. Thus, autonomous artworks are free to create a framework of their own: in other terms, they can define their own rules. This is how autonomous artworks may be envisioned as effectively subversive and more politically charged than ‘committed’ artworks themselves. As Adorno put it: ‘politics has migrated into autonomous art’.​[9]​ For committed artworks, in their claim to resist power, attempt to challenge it at the level of their ethics. From this perspective, committed artworks may be envisaged, somewhat reductively, as mere positivist subordinations to cognitive meaning; paradoxically, they provide a chance to be immediately integrated – co-opted – by the dominant power, which uses the same epistemological grounds than those of committed artworks.
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